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Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) is an epidemiologically, politically, and socially complex
disease. Across multiple international contexts, policy makers have struggled to balance
the competing demands of wildlife and agricultural interests in their efforts to create
workable and effective disease management strategies. This paper draws comparative
lessons between the cases of Michigan in the USA and the UK to exemplify some of
the challenges of developing an effective strategy for the long-term control of endemic
disease, particularly reflecting on efforts to “responsibilise” cattle producers and engage
them in proactive activities to mitigate transmission risks on their own farms. Using
qualitative data derived from 22 stakeholder interviews, it is argued that the management
of bTB in Michigan has important lessons for the UK on the role of human dimensions in
influencing the direction of disease control. The management of endemic bTB relies on
the actions of individuals to minimise risk and, in contrast to the predominantly voluntary
approach pursued in the UK, Michigan has shifted the emphasis towards obtaining
producer support for wildlife risk mitigation and biosecurity via a mix of regulatory,
fiscal, and social interventions. Whilst the scale of the bTB challenge differs between
these two contexts, analysis of the different ideological bases for selecting management
approaches offers interesting insights on the role of negotiated outcomes in attempts to
adaptively manage a disease that is characterised by complexity and uncertainty.
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INTRODUCTION
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) is principally a disease of cattle, but there are several places worldwide
where free-ranging wildlife are reservoirs of infection, namely brushtail possums in New Zealand,
European badgers in the United Kingdom, wood bison and elk in Canada, African buffalo in South
Africa and white-tailed deer in the United States (1). Where the disease has become established,
it can have considerable economic consequences for livestock keepers and poses challenges for
national governments and agencies in devising a workable and socially acceptable eradication plan.
The ultimate rationale for intervention is based on the potential threatMycobacterium bovis poses
to public health (2); however, the proximate driver for expenditure on bTB management is the
potential economic effect of trade restrictions on milk and meat products (3, 4) and the wider
ecological concerns associated with potential disease spread into new regions and ecosystems.
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The case for eradication has been contested based upon cost
benefit criteria and the relative importance of the risk posed to
human health [see (5–7)], but it remains the declared goal for
many international control programmes [see, for example, (4, 8)].
Experiences from around the world exemplify the challenges
faced by disease managers in constructing a coherent, cost-
effective, and workable strategy for eradication. Multiple
ecological and epidemiological challenges remain [see (9, 10)
for a review], but socio-economic and political factors also
have a key role to play in influencing the outcomes of disease
control strategies; including, the cost-effectiveness of the policies,
political will to implement management programmes and the
social acceptability of individual control measures. The UK
is perhaps the foremost example of the difficulties involved
in constructing a control regime under conditions of intense
socio-political scrutiny. A primary point of contention has been
the decision to cull badgers in England, which are considered
to have important cultural associations for the general public
[see (11, 12)]. Vigorous debate on the role of badger culling
in the control of bTB has resulted in policies that have been
considered to lack coherence (13) and a situation where the
devolved administrations pursue their own control policies, with
differing approaches to addressing the disease in their wildlife
populations (14, 15)1. This has resulted in what Allen et al. [(10),
p. 110] considers this to be part of “the current impasse in bTB
control” across Britain and Ireland, withmulti-factorial problems
inhibiting the national eradication programmes.
Socio-economic and political factors have been highlighted
as determinants of success in analyses of international control
programmes. For example, Professor Ian Boyd, The Chief
Scientific Adviser to the UK government’s Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) described bovine
tuberculosis as a “sociological problem,” stressing the importance
of human dimensions in influencing disease outcomes. Similar
claims have beenmade in review papers on the complexity of bTB
control (16) and in studies of eradication attempts in the US (1),
Australia (17), and New Zealand (18, 19). These determinants
tend to focus on three separate, but interconnected factors: the
effectiveness of political decision-making; social acceptability of
the policies; and the attitudes and actions of affected stakeholders.
This paper focuses on the experience of bTB control in
the US state of Michigan to provide a comparison for current
and future policy developments in the UK. Whilst the scale
of the problem in Michigan is different to the UK, there are
interesting comparators in terms of socio-economic and political
factors influencing the perceived success of efforts to achieve
effective disease control. For example, Carstensen et al. (1)
reported, “public tolerance” and political will were considered
to exert significant influence on the control measures available
to disease managers in the US. The authors also cite a series
1Animal health is a devolved issue in the United Kingdom. England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland each have the ability to develop and implement
their own control policy for bovine tuberculosis, which is currently subject
to oversight and audit by the Food and Veterinary Office of the European
Commission. It should be noted that Scotland has beenOfficially Tuberculosis Free
(OTF) since September 2009.
of temporal, social, economic, and logistical factors that shaped
public and stakeholder attitudes towards aggressive disease
control strategies, the limitations that these factors placed on
management options and the subsequent implications for bTB
eradication from the wildlife reservoirs in the USA. Carstensen
et al. (1) concluded that, in comparison to the response to a
notable outbreak of bTB inMinnesota in 2006, which successfully
prevented the self-sustaining establishment of the disease in
wildlife, Michigan has lacked the leadership to initiate more
“aggressive” bTB management strategies in both cattle (via, for
example, buy-out options for herds in areas of high bTB risk)
and wildlife (through substantial reduction in deer numbers via
intensive culling).
Without the will to institute more “aggressive” responses to
controlling the disease in cattle and wildlife populations, the
management of bTB often requires a negotiated management
response, based upon the level of funding available and the
buy-in from the thousands of individual disease managers (e.g.,
farmers, hunters, and the like) tasked with controlling the disease
over a sustained period. As Miller (20) notes, management of
diseases at the livestock–wildlife interface often require long-
term engagement using a combination of altered livestock
husbandry practices, active disease suppression in wildlife,
and prevention of transmission using mitigation techniques.
Considerable attention has been given to the development of
interventions designed to mitigate the risk of bTB disease
transmission between cattle and wildlife [see (21, 22)]. Generally,
the research concludes that risk mitigation interventions such as
deer exclusion fences have great potential but the challenge lies in
farmers modifying their husbandry practices and behaviours (20)
including maintaining the integrity of fences and keeping gates
closed (23, 24). Risk mitigation measures that rely on stakeholder
adoption of preventative behaviours [see (25)], therefore, pose
challenges for risk managers in formulating measures that will
incentivize positive responses.
Similar issues can be observed in the UK relating to the
adoption of preventative biosecurity measures at the farm level.
Whilst biosecurity is cited as a key part of the Defra’s 25 year
Strategy to Achieve Officially Bovine Tuberculosis Free Status for
England (2014), multiple challenges remain regarding farmers’
adoption of measures to reduce the risk of bTB transmission
between cattle and between cattle and wildlife. Farmers can be
reticent to implement measures because of the limited evidence
surrounding the efficacy of many of the interventions (9, 26, 27);
the perceived impracticality of implementing measures on their
own farms (28), particularly relating to badger exclusion and
isolation of bought in cattle, and the uncertain benefits that will
accrue in reducing their risk of a bTB breakdown as opposed
to the costs of modifying feed and water sources, installing
fences to reduce contacts with neighboring herds or establishing
isolation facilities for newly bought in animals. Whilst farmers
acknowledge the theoretical importance of biosecurity as a
preventative measure, this does not always result in taking action
to reduce risks on farm (29–31). Such reluctance to act may
be associated with farmers’ often-reported “fatalistic” belief that
there is little that they can proactively do to prevent a bTB
breakdown or that “luck” rather than their own actions has more
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of an influence on the likelihood of the disease entering their
herds (32–34).
Currently, the majority of biosecurity measures outlined in
Defra’s 25 year Strategy are voluntary, with some additional
requirements for farms within badger culling areas and for
“persistent” bTB herds. Improving biosecurity on and off farm
is stated as an important management goal within Defra’s
Strategy. As the literature indicates, risk managers will need to
formulate measures to address the apparent disjuncture between
the acknowledged importance yet under-implementation of risk
mitigation measures on farm. Using Michigan as a case study,
the objectives of this study were to investigate management
approaches, policies and interventions designed to engage
farmers in adopting and sustaining preventative bTB biosecurity
measures and qualitatively assess their impact in contributing to
disease control.
The paper will outline some of the comparative lessons
that can be learned from Michigan in their attempts to
enhance the on-farm risk mitigation element of their disease
management strategies and the policies considered most effective
in encouraging proactive disease management at the farm level.
METHODOLOGY
The research focused on stakeholder perspectives on eradication
efforts, assessing the relative merits of different policy
interventions aimed at disease management and appraising
the key factors affecting efforts to achieve bTB eradication. The
research approach was based upon 22 in-depth face to face
interviews conducted at the end of 2014. Non-probabilistic,
purposive sampling [akin to (25, 35)] was used to select
interviewees with individuals identified based upon their roles
as “experts” and “key stakeholders” involved in the development
or implementation of bTB policies in Michigan. This research
was part of a wider study that included a further set of interviews
in Minnesota; the results of which was not reported here.
Interviewees were stratified into the following three broad
categories: agency professionals involved in bTB management in
cattle or wildlife (wildlife managers, programme coordinators,
field veterinarians, and communications specialists); university
academic and extension personnel; and cattle producer and
wildlife stakeholders involved in implementing management
practices on the ground. Interviews were conducted in the
State capital and in the Modified Accredited Zone (MAZ)
in the northeastern lower peninsula (NELP) of Michigan,
concentrating on the counties of Alcona, Alpena, Montmorency,
and Oscoda Counties.
The research was designed to be a qualitative, in-depth
assessment of bTB management approaches in Michigan. As
indicated by Naylor et al. [(36), p. 286] “interviewing is the
method most often adopted to explore potentially sensitive
and controversial issues. . . and are often commended as a
research method for their flexibility and ability to explore
difficult issues in a comprehensive and sensitive manner.” Unlike
the standardised and structured approaches of farmer attitude
surveys or Q-Methodology [e.g., (35, 37, 38)] the interviews
were semi-structured and discussions were based around a set
of themes within an interview guide; this approach has been
used in equivalent qualitative studies on bTB and biosecurity
[see (32)]. The interview guide consisted of questions relating
to the participant’s role in bTB control; overview of the factors
influencing the relative success of bTB control (including
identifying effective policies and interventions); identification
of key stakeholders and their positive or negative contribution
to disease management; modes of risk communication and
the challenges and successes encountered in promoting “best
practice” in disease mitigation; and lessons learnt from their
experience of managing bTB in Michigan2. Each interview was
tailored to the expertise and knowledge of the interviewee and
so the focus of each discussion was context specific. However, all
interviewees were asked about and responded to questions on
policies and interventions that were considered to be effective
in encouraging disease managers (e.g., farmers and hunters)
to adopt positive disease management practices. The results of
which are reported here.
Interviews were digitally recorded (with the participants’
informed consent) and later fully transcribed. The data was
manually coded in order to develop an empirically grounded
coding framework, guided by the key research questions. This
involved an iterative and in-depth process of “careful reading and
re-reading of the data” [(39), p. 258], beginning with an informal
reading of the materials to identify an initial set of high-level
thematic codes. The approach followed the conventions of Seidel
and Kelle (40) quoted in Basit [(41), p. 144] who “view the role
of coding as noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples
of those phenomena; and analyzing those phenomena in order
to find commonalities, differences, patterns and structures.”
Categories were developed via a process “data distillation” (42) to
organise the coded data intomeaningful overarching themes. The
themes were based upon concepts from existing literature and
from words and phrases used by the interviewees e.g., notions
of responsibility and responsibilisation; social networks and peer
example; drivers and incentives. These themes are represented as
organising concepts in the results section.
Following a broad introduction to bTB management
approaches in Michigan, an overview will be provided of
the Wildlife Risk Mitigation project, which was identified
as being a key development in efforts to enhance on-farm
biosecurity activities.
RESULTS
Management Approaches for bTB
in Michigan
On-farm Wildlife Risk Mitigation (WRM) is part of a
wider approach to bTB management in Michigan, including
surveillance, and control measures aimed at reducing the disease
burden in both cattle and wildlife (white-tailed deer). The focus
2For study replication purposes, the interview guide is included as a
Supplementary Data File. Full details of the sampling, research approach,
and anonymized transcripts can be found within the ReShare UK Data
Service repository.
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of this paper is WRM, however a brief overview of the control
programme is described here.
Michigan was declared free of bTB in cattle and bison in
1979. However, in 1975, and again in 1994, bTB was identified
in one wild white-tail deer in the NELP of Michigan. Subsequent
testing revealed the disease to be endemic in the white-tail deer
population within five of the most north easterly counties of
the Lower Peninsula. Since 1995 surveillance and testing has
been carried out in the affected area via annual surveillance of
hunter harvested deer. To date, the disease has been confirmed
in nearly 875 of over 254,000 free-ranging deer tested in
Michigan, with 77% of bTB-positive deer found in a core area—
Deer Management Unit 452—in the NELP of Michigan, where
the counties of Alcona, Alpena, Montmorency, and Oscoda
meet (Figure 1). Reduction in deer density within the affected
area is a key part of the policy, with enhanced measures
introduced over successive seasons designed to maximise legal
opportunities for the public to harvest deer. These strategies
include liberalised hunting seasons; issuing landowners Deer
Management Assistance permits to supplement hunting licences;
providing disease control permits to cattle producers and non-
agricultural landowners in high prevalence areas; and, most
recently, the introduction of the Hunter Access Program, to
match hunters in search of places to hunt with agricultural
landowners seeking additional deer harvest on their land. Deer
baiting and feeding bans are also in operation in some of the
affected areas.
Following the identification of bTB positive deer in the 1990s,
the reinstatement of cattle testing in the affected area revealed the
first infected cattle herd in June 1998. Michigan subsequently lost
its bTB free status in June 2000 and state-wide surveillance testing
was instituted from 2000 to 2003. The Upper Peninsula regained
bTB Free status in 2005 and 57 counties in the Lower Peninsula
regained bTB Free status in 2011. Surveillance testing identified
a core disease outbreak area in 11 counties in the northeastern
tip of the Lower Peninsula; since October 2014, seven more of
those counties have been declared bTB Free for cattle, leaving
4 remaining. Annual testing of all livestock (cattle, goats, bison)
and captive cervids remains in place in the 4 counties (classified
as the MAZ by the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services Branch3),
with risk-based testing applied throughout the remainder of the
State. In the MAZ, the traceability and movement of livestock
is regulated through movement permits obtained from the field
offices of the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MDARD), electronic identification of animals
and annual herd inventories to reconcile discrepancies between
animals on farm and official records. Other policies governing
livestock movements and limiting deer-cattle contacts will be
covered more fully in the following section.
3The prevalence of infection a State or zone are classified in five categories: (1)
Accredited-free state or zone; (2) Modified Accredited Advanced state or zone; (3)
Modified Accredited state or zone; (4) Accreditation Preparatory state or zone; and
(5) Non-Accredited state or zone [see (43) for an explanation of the United States
bTB accreditation categories].
FIGURE 1 | Deer Management Unit (DMU) 452, in northeastern
Lower Peninsula of Michigan, USA.
Wildlife Risk Mitigation
WRM is now a key element of the bTB management strategy,
particularly concentrating on the commercial farms in and
around the MAZ in the NELP of Michigan, identified as at risk
for bTB transmission fromwildlife. The policy began as a series of
small scale activities at Michigan State University (MSU) which,
from 2008, formalised into a voluntary initiative developed
by MDARD, MSU Extension, United States Department of
Agriculture (Veterinary Services, Wildlife Services), and the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), with some
input from industry. The objective of the programme was to
assist producers in identifying high risk areas and practices
on their holding and develop plans to reduce the risk of
cattle-wildlife interactions. The approach was designed to form
part of the “safety nets” (44) put in place to control the
disease, complementing the surveillance testing and movement
restrictions in helping to prevent opportunities for infection; the
ultimate aim being to draw down the disease incidence in cattle.
The programme required changes to be made to management
practices and farm infrastructure in the endemic area. It relied
upon the development of a series of interventions to assist and
influence the implementation of risk reduction measures on
farm, including the introduction of hoop barns and deer-proof
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fencing to protect stored feeds and actions related to cattle
accessing feed and water sources. The changes required at farm-
level meant that the concept of WRM was controversial from
the outset. According to a Michigan policy lead, “this was
probably the most controversial thing that happened in the course
of the bTB programme; more so even than testing. . . there was
a tremendous amount of angst and anger about this wildlife
risk project.” Producer concerns focused on the practicalities of
excluding deer from their property; the cost of implementing the
measures and a perceived inadequacy on the part of Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) to deal effectively with the disease
in wildlife (e.g., through the reduction of deer numbers). Due to
the contentious nature of the proposal, the policy making process
involved a series of meetings to develop proposals and standards
which were an acceptable compromise between what was desired
by policy makers and risk managers and what was considered
achievable in practice by the agricultural industry. The process
was described in the following terms by an individual involved in
the development of the scheme:
“it’s that idea of, okay, if you can’t build 20 foot or 12 foot high
barbed wire fences all the way round . . .where are the opportunities
to reduce risk most cost effectively? So we got the best available
science from [Michigan’s bTB Programme] and we started sharing
it with our stakeholders, the producers and let them decide.”
The process of negotiation, over a series of three meetings,
focused on achieving a balance between an epidemiological
ideal and an implementable policy. The process was facilitated
by MSU staff as intermediaries and the University published
the document.
Implementation
The implementation of the scheme was described by its
instigators in terms of a phased approach, based upon the
principles of adaptive management [see (45–47)]: phase one was
aimed at individuals identified as “early adopters” who were
engaged with a prototype version of the WRM intervention; the
second phase was an expansion of the programme, designed
to appeal to “capable learners”; and the third was regulatory
enforcements to draw in those who were “resistant to change.”
It was also phased in regionally; MDARD concentrated on the
outlying areas first, where there was an opportunity to elevate
the accreditation status more swiftly (for example, in Michigan’s
Northwest Region where bTB was not endemic in wild deer)
and moved on to the more challenging and higher risk area
of the MAZ over time. This incremental approach evolved into
an increasingly statutory regime and relied on a number of key
push and pull factors designed to maximise participation in the
scheme. A combination of one-to-one assistance, co-funding of
risk mitigation measures (such as deer fencing) and restrictions
placed on market access have been employed to both encourage
and enable producer engagement in the scheme, but also to make
it challenging for them to stay outside of the system.
The WRM project is designed around a five-step process
which aims to bring livestock producers and technical experts
together to create a tailored on-farm plan to reduce the
risk of infection between cattle and wildlife. Producers are
offered an educational meeting before completing an on-farm
risk assessment. The risk assessment is conducted between
government agency staff and is designed to be both educational
(recognising potentially risky areas, and practices on farm) and
regulatory, with the implementation of certain mitigation actions
being classified as compulsory. Once the WRM Action Plan has
been agreed, the producer then indicates a timescale within which
they propose to complete the actions. Depending on the risks
identified on farm, these actions may include interventions to
limit potential infection transfer at sites where cattle are fed
(governing where, how often and howmuch cattle are fed), water
sources for cattle and where cattle feed is stored. Each of these
sites have been identified as a risk for disease transmission (48,
49) and so require changes to management practices, including
fencing off feed and water sources to prevent deer access. Once
the plan has been implemented, the work is subject to an annual
verification process to check that the interventions and actions
are still in place.
As part of the development of the plan, a cost-sharing scheme
was introduced to assist cattle producers in implementing the
actions. During 2008–2013, over $3.6m was expended on WRM
measures. Government, state and federal funds accounted for
$2,637,000 of this figure and a further $1,002,000 was contributed
by cattle producers. In the early phases of the scheme, 50% of the
cost-share funding came from the state and the USDA, and in
the later phases, the bTB programme utilised the USDA, NRCS’s
Environmental Quality Incentives Programme. The benefit of the
latter approach being that mutual aims could be achieved from a
single funding allocation and that the conservation office, which
already had close historical links to the farming community,
could take over the responsibilities for the continuation and
annual verification of the scheme.
Drivers and Incentives
The development of the risk assessment and verification process
was originally badged as a voluntary approach. However,
(dis)incentives were introduced to influence the level of uptake
amongst producers. One interviewee described it as, “incentives
on the cattle side were, first of all, it was disincentives, you
couldn’t move [cattle] if you didn’t do it.” Additional testing
and restrictions on market access were the primary levers to
encourage uptake of the WRM. The policy stipulated that a
pre-movement test be carried out on cattle from non-WRM
farms, with a further post-movement test 60 to 120 days after
purchase being required of the purchaser at their own expense.
The rationale for the approach was described by an individual
involved in developing the policy as follows:
“So the state used to pay for all that [testing] and in these counties
we’ve said okay, you know, you have an hour, you could get a
biosecurity plan and you don’t have to do this test, but, you know, if
you don’t want to do that that’s fine, you can do this additional test,
but you get to pay for it now and then the guy who buys your cows,
unless he gets them slaughtered, has to also do a test at his expense.
Well that means that the cattle are discounted, because when people
go, oh, I got to do a test, well that’s going to cost me something, so
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I’m not going to pay quite so much for these cattle and so that has
driven some people and we were trying to use market forces to, you
know, move people towards doing the right thing.”
Through restricting market access and attaching a financial
disincentive to the cattle from non-WRM farms, the aim was to
shift producers’ assessment of the costs and benefits in favour
of enrolling in the WRM scheme. The (dis)incentives were
strengthened in January 2015, when regulations were introduced
stating that all farms in the bTB core area must be wildlife
risk mitigated; otherwise, these producers could only send their
animals to slaughter.
Social Networks and Peer Example
In addition to perceived economic (dis)benefits, risk managers
involved in developing, and refining Michigan’s eradication
programme employed a series of techniques to influence the
social context into which their strategies were being placed. The
approach included the use of existing social networks within the
locality to promote sign up to the scheme and peer example
coupled with “teachable moments” to encourage producer-
advocates of the scheme to explain the benefits, particularly
following cases of bTB outbreaks where WRM may have been
assistive in preventing disease transmission. The rationale being,
as summarised by an extension agent, “peer example, call it,
rather than peer pressure, can be very effective.” The use of
social networks was seen as a way of dealing with the negative
view towards government officials and enlisting more trusted
intermediaries to deliver the message on the benefits of the
scheme. This approach is exemplified in the following quotes:
“I think other people have said okay yeah if I’m hearing this from
my neighbour and my friend I’m not hearing it from the state
veterinarian or, you know, some USDA regulator, but I’m hearing
it from, you know, my friends and they tend to take it a little bit
more seriously, especially if you’re seeing that person every day or
at church or in a grocery store or at the bar or whatever, so that
makes it a little bit more real”.
“So one of the things we did, we had I don’t know about maybe
45, 46 of these that were still hanging out here in the farms in
here that had not done a biosecurity plan and so back in April
I made phone calls to people that work on these farms and just
trying to ascertain who is the person that might most effectively
communicate things in a positive way, where we would get them
actually to do something and so actually some of our guys, you
know, are relatives to these people or they’ve cultivated, you know,
decent relationships.”
The role of these gate keepers within the producer community
was important to facilitate wider implementation, using
existing social networks to connect government authorities with
producers at the farm level. There were also particular individuals
that were highly functional in terms of engaging producers and
hunters in disease management efforts, be they as an identifiable,
visible, and approachable lead of the bTB programme or as key
personnel within the areas most at risk from a bTB outbreak. In
the words of one policy maker, “[t]he policies were supporting
the risk mitigation, the policies were making sure you had some
local expertise, it wasn’t just coming out of Lansing to talk to
people.” The division of “distant” government officials in the
State Capital of Lansing and the affected communities in the
NELP was addressed through convening local meetings, placing
the onus on appointing personnel from within the local area and
working through MSU extension, which has long-established
links with cattle producers via existing research programmes and
community outreach.
Sustaining Disease Management Practices
During the development phases, it was recognised that the
installation of measures such as deer fencing was only the
first part of a successful WRM plan. The second part was the
maintenance and continued use of measures by cattle producers,
such as keeping gates to feed sources closed. The challenge of
sustaining disease management practices at the farm level was
described in the following terms:
“How do we get producers to do that, how do we support it, you
know, how do wemaintain it, because, you know, you can pour a lot
of money into fencing and, you know, other mitigation, but if you
do it for 1 year and then you say it’s too much trouble, you know,
to keep the fences maintained and stuff like it doesn’t really matter
then, so it’s not only doing the mitigation, but then maintaining it
over time.”
To address this challenge, conditions were attached to the grants
allocated for co-funding of WRM measures. Producers were
required to sign a contract outlining their obligations (e.g.,
closing gates) and if they were found to be in contravention
of those conditions, then the state would be entitled to reclaim
the cost-share money and the farm’s WRM verification would
be withdrawn, with consequent implications for trade and
enhanced testing.
Promoting Action and Assessing Impact
WRM began as a controversial policy aimed at enhanced risk
mitigation at the farm level. As already noted, the development
was controversial because of the implications that the new
measures and requirements had for farm management decisions
and infrastructure. During interviews, stakeholders reflected on
the difficulties involved in introducing and implementing the
scheme, but also recognised the perceived benefits that WRM
provided in terms of enhanced disease management through
reducing risk at the livestock-wildlife interface and the transfer
of responsibilities for disease management to producers on their
own properties. The following section provides an overview of
stakeholder perspectives on the perceived utility and impact of
the WRM scheme.
Responsibility
A clear reason for the development of the WRM scheme was
to re-centre the responsibility for keeping bTB out of herds
back into the hands of the cattle producers. Whilst WRM has
been a predominantly government-led scheme (with input from
producers and producer organisations), the aim has been to
highlight what producers can do on their own holdings to
mitigate risk and then, via co-funding and advisory visits, enable
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them to implement exclusion measures such as barns and deer
fences. This represented a step change in the policy. In the words
of a field veterinarian:
“I mean before [WRM] it was just test, test, test, test, test, test,
find it, where do we find it? And it wasn’t until the wildlife risk
programme started that we started having something to say hey,
let’s do something to help prevent it”.
The emphasis on engaging producers in proactive action was
driven by a number of considerations: first, the need for
producers in the NELP to act in the interest of the rest of the cattle
industry in the state of Michigan (to retain interstate market
access); and second, the realisation that deer would remain only
a partially controllable element of disease transmission due to a
perceived—on the part of the cattle industry—lack of social and
political will to reduce deer densities. Producers were, therefore,
encouraged to look at what they could do on their own holdings
to institute some control over the opportunities for transmission
within the farm boundaries.
Whilst the aim was to transfer responsibility for mitigating
risk to individual producers, the initiative remained
government-led. Through the implementation of market-
driven interventions, co-funding opportunities and increasingly
statutory measures, the onus for compliance came from a
regulatory source. Thus, replacing the previous approach of
leaving it to individual farmers to assess and institute risk
management on farm and relying on peer pressure amongst
producers to encourage uptake. When asked about the role of
peer pressure, a cattle producer commented:
“It’s not so much peer pressure as it is pressure on the government
or those above to make the policies that’ll force them into it, yeah,
that’s more the pressure than me going over. I don’t want to go over
to my neighbour and tell him you have to do this, you know, I can
go over there and nicely tell him why he should do it, but for me to
go tell him he has to do it I don’t want to do that, I don’t want to
put myself in that spot either.”
Engendering greater responsibility for assessing what was
possible on individual holdings and underlining producers’
ability to exert some control over their own situations was an
important driver. This was, however, coupled with a more top-
down approach of imposing market and regulatory conditions to
promote and embed management changes across areas most at
risk from a bTB breakdown.
Assessing the Impacts
WRM was designed as a management strategy to reduce
rather than eliminate risk on farm, placing the emphasis on
taking greater control over limiting opportunities for deer-cattle
interactions and working with producers to focus on the elements
within their control to promote effective management of deer-
cattle interactions. In terms of benefits, interviewees cited a
greater awareness amongst producers of the risks posed to their
own farms and enhanced actions around careful storage of cattle
feed, with wider general improvements to biosecurity. Whilst
being unable to provide evidence for or quantify the benefits
of WRM, an assumption was shared amongst interviewees that
decreasing the risk of contacts would decrease the number of
cases. This opinion is exemplified in the following quotes—the
first from amember of the USDA’s epidemiological research team
and the second from a cattle producer in the high risk area of
the MAZ:
“Well if the producers are compliant with their plan it has I believe
reduced the wildlife livestock interface quite a bit and it’s also made
people I think more aware of how the disease transmission could
occur and what they need to do to decrease the amount of contact
that the cattle have with deer.”
“Well the risk mitigation I believe has worked. It’s not foolproof,
but it has helped. If nothing else has brought it to the people’s
attention that these are the focus areas that they should focus on,
you know, keeping the feed away and that type of thing. It’s brought
some attention at least that way and I think some people are
becoming more receptive to “agriculture’s going to have to take some
role in this.” I mean when this first started Ag kind of stepped back
and said this is their [the DNR’s] problem; let them deal with it and
it’ll work out when they work out their problem. Well obviously,
we’re not going to reach that point, so we have to step up to the plate
and do our part too. Now we have different opinions on what our
part is, you know, every person has a different opinion what they’re
willing to do and capable of doing.”
Both of these quotes raise the issue of producers’ implementation
of the stipulated measures, and is indicative of a wider theme of
discussion on compliance with the control regime. Producers and
those involved in the preparation and verification of individual
farm plans, stated that WRM tended to be based upon a
negotiation between the ideals envisaged by state agencies and
the practicalities of what was considered achievable at the farm
level. This process was described by producers as a form of
“trading” back and forth to find a plan that was acceptable to both
parties. Finding this middle ground for WRM was considered to
be more constructive than imposing a set of measures that were
deemed unattainable by the producer and which may prompt
non-compliance. As one producer commented,
I’m sure [MDARD] would like us to tighten up a lot of our
standards. . . but then nobody’s going to follow through with it. . . .
our standard might not be exactly as high as we want it to be, but if
it’ll address 50% of the risk and they’ll do it 100% of the time; that’s
better than addressing 90% of the risk and doing it none of the time.
The same producer stated that, if measures were too onerous,
there would be a temptation to make sure that the farm seemed
compliant for the winter inspection, but that the effort would not
be sustained throughout the remainder of the year.
In addition to reporting that the prevailing opinion had
become one of grudging acceptance within the industry, the
interviewed producers also raised concerns about what they
considered to be the negative consequences of WRM. Issues
cited included the reduced carrying capacity of farms (due to
restrictions on grazing and availability of land for harvesting
winter forage in areas considered attractive to and frequented by
wild deer) and the negative implications for smaller producers
who were less able to absorb the costs of complying with the
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new management regime. Whilst lower stocking densities and
removing smaller producers less able to comply with WRM
regulations may have positive benefits for the programme as a
whole, the social implications of “it hurts some people” was raised
as an issue.
A final point of note was the importance of risk perception
in sustaining the momentum of the programme. The perception
being that, as the sense of risk associated with tackling bTB
decreases, the levels of complacency in sustaining disease
management efforts increases. The risk of complacency was
considered a high priority when developing a control strategy
for a disease where endemic infection in the wildlife population
persists. Progress towards eradication ultimately depends on a
long-term commitment from multiple stakeholders (including
producers, hunters, state agencies, and the federal government)
to implement mitigation measures, provide adequate economic
and political support for sustained management interventions
and sustain the policy direction towards a goal that may take
decades to achieve.
DISCUSSION
This paper has highlighted that bTB is an epidemiologically,
socially and politically complex disease, creating multiple
challenges for disease managers in constructing a coherent, cost-
effective and workable strategy for eradication. This complexity
is particularly pertinent in countries where the disease has
become endemic in cattle and wildlife populations, demanding
a long-term, multifactorial approach that is dependent upon a
comprehensive set of control measures, sustained political will,
adequate funding, stakeholder involvement and acceptance of
interventions. Michigan and the UK have been highlighted as
examples of how this complexity has played out in practice and
underlines the case that the development of bTB management
strategies need to be viewed as a social as well as scientific
undertaking. This argument is in line with the analysis of
Gormley and Corner (50) who point to the key role of
stakeholders in bTB eradication programmes around the world
and underlines calls for interdisciplinary research [e.g., (51–53)]
and the development of viable management solutions based upon
socio-technical approaches and interventions.
Enhancing Engagement
Human dimensions have been recognised as a key factor
influencing the relative success of management approaches
(17, 19, 54) with research efforts focusing on the role of
public acceptability of wildlife control measures, the attitudes
and actions of stakeholders (38, 55, 56) and the adoption of
preventative biosecurity measures at the individual farm level.
A central research theme, particularly in the UK, has focused
on the adoption of biosecurity interventions and efforts to
enhance opportunities to limit disease transmission between
cattle and between cattle and wildlife at the farm level. Research
has highlighted key reasons for the under-implementation of
measures, including fatalism, uncertainty and scepticism on
the practicality and efficacy of biosecurity interventions and,
consequently, an unclear cost-benefit analysis of spend vs. gain.
Critically, in an endemic disease situation, progress towards
eradication will depend upon sustaining risk mitigation efforts
over long periods, depending on the cooperation and buy in
of producers and key stakeholders. The research reported here
sought to provide an analysis of how risk mitigation became
embedded within the state of Michigan’s eradication programme
and uses stakeholder narratives to identify key components that
were considered effective in generating change.
The literature review identified a specific challenge for risk
managers: formulating measures that incentivise positive and
proactive risk management actions from stakeholders (25). The
findings presented here identified Michigan’s WRM programme
as a step change in the state’s approach to disease control.
Interviewees identified the programme as a means to transfer
some of the responsibility to producers to take a more proactive
approach towards risk mitigation, first relying on voluntary
uptake and then moving to more statutory measures. Social
as well as technical processes were developed to address some
of the barriers to change identified in the social scientific
literature. For example, WRM was used as a tool to shift
the uncertain cost-benefit of instituting biosecurity measures
through introducing market and regulatory (dis)incentives;
“trusted intermediaries” were identified to communicate with
producers, recognising the lack of trust and confidence in
government agencies to eradicate the disease (57–60) and finally,
questions of practicality and efficacy were addressed by working
with individual producers to highlight opportunities for change,
facilitating their implementation via co-funding and enforcing
change where necessary. WRM is essentially a government-
led programme with regulatory backing, but the creation of
individual farm plans is based upon a negotiation, balancing
the epidemiological ideals of risk mitigation with the willingness
and ability of producers to institute what are considered to
be practical and acceptable interventions on their holdings.
Interviewees could not provide evidence of the effectiveness
of WRM, but considered it to be successful in changing
the management approach towards more actively involving
producers in the control strategy for mitigating their own risks.
When drawing comparisons between Michigan and countries
with areas affected by endemic bTB such as the UK, there are
limitations that should be recognised when offering any “lessons
learnt.” First, this is a relatively small qualitative study which
was designed to be illustrative rather than representative of
stakeholder views. Second, the scale of Michigan’s bTB problem
is very different to that of the UK, with only 5–6 cases per year
in the cattle herd and a prevalence of around 2% in the deer
population (47). For example, in 2016, 4 beef herds, 1 feedlot,
and 1 dairy herd within the MAZ were found to be bTB positive,
which was considered a “spike” in incidence of infected herds
(54). By comparison, in the same year, there were 3,753 new bTB
incidents in England alone (61). Third, as with any international
comparison, there is a difference in the political context for
decision-making; particularly relevant in this case is the need
for the state of Michigan to conform to Federal requirements
established by the USDA, which govern the acceptable level
of bTB prevalence and is the ultimate arbiter for restricting
or enabling interstate trade of cattle. The different pressures
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applied and the balance established between maintaining a viable
cattle industry and eradicating bTB are important contextual
factors in guiding the policies pursued in charting a course
towards eradication.
Whilst recognising these caveats of generalisability, scale
and differing political contexts, the Michigan experience does
offer an interesting case study in negotiating the challenges
of shifting the focus beyond testing and surveillance towards
obtaining producer engagement in WRM and farm biosecurity.
Defra’s Strategy to Achieve Officially TB Free Status for
England similarly recognises the need to engage farmers in
reducing their risk through careful cattle purchasing and limiting
opportunities for transmission between cattle and between
cattle and wildlife. However, the Strategy largely remains
split between the application of statutory control measures—
including continuous surveillance of cattle herds, removal of
bTB test reactors and other cattle suspected of being infected
with bTB and movement restrictions for bTB breakdown
herds—and a predominantly non-statutory (voluntary) approach
towards biosecurity implementation. In recognition of the
persistent challenges surrounding biosecurity implementation
[see (31)], there are ongoing discussions to identify mechanisms
to encourage herd owners to take additional steps to improve
their purchasing and biosecurity practices, including linking
compensation to membership of herd health schemes such
as the Cattle Health Certification Standards (CHeCS) scheme
(62) and investigating means to give “earned recognition” to
farmers for verifiable good biosecurity practices [see (63–65)
for context]. This represents a movement towards rethinking
the governance of biosecurity, but remains dependent upon the
voluntary enrolment of farmers which, to date, has resulted in
limited sign-up to the Bovine TB Herd Accreditation element
of the CHeCS cattle health scheme. Clearly, as was the case in
Michigan prior to the introduction of WRM, the challenge of
achieving sustained farmer engagement remains unresolved and
potentially requires a rethink of the socio-technical mechanisms
by which this could be achieved.
Responsibilisation
Developing a greater sense of responsibility for biosecurity
management is an important theme in both the Michigan case
study and in policy narratives in the UK. As reported in the work
of multiple social scientists, the “responsibilisation” of a wide
range of actors beyond government is a process closely linked
to the increasing neoliberalisation of animal health management,
shifting the onus on to industry and farmers to manage their
own risks through enhanced “biosecure citizenship” (66–69).
This reflects wider trends in international policy development
towards “empowering” citizens to take greater control of their
own individual and community well-being in, for example,
making themselves less vulnerable to crime through changing
their actions and routines to minimise their potential exposure to
risk, or making proactive changes to diet and exercise to mitigate
future health risks (70, 71).
Whilst the principle of enhanced responsibility is a common
theme between the Michigan and UK policy landscapes, the
mechanisms to achieve change are different. As Enticott et al. (27)
report, the UK model of promoting biosecurity has developed
within a political context based upon an ideological reluctance to
regulate and has increasingly relied upon theories of behaviour
change designed to “nudge” farmers towards taking action via
the use of social norms and provision of information to guide
choices [see also (72, 73)]. Examples include the introduction of
ibTB—a publically available web-based interactive map showing
the locations of bTB breakdowns and breakdowns resolved in the
last 5 years, in England [see (74)]—and the promotion of the
principles of risk-based trading to encourage farmers to make
“informed” cattle purchasing decisions and reduce the risk of
introducing disease via trade (75–77). This strategy is essentially
voluntary, based upon improved communications to heighten
awareness towards mitigating risks and operates as a “population
strategy” [see (27)] using universal biosecurity principles to
convey what should be “best practice” rather than considering
applications that are more specific to individual farm contexts.
Conversely, Michigan has moved towards a mix of regulatory,
fiscal and social interventions that attempt to fit the ideals of
standardised biosecurity protocols to specific farm contexts on
a one-to-one basis (54).
The neoliberal logic of devolving biosecurity governance to
industry and individual farmers has been questioned in the
social scientific literature, citing farm-level and institutional
factors as reasons why enhanced participation is unlikely to
occur [see (78)]. For example, the approach assumes that
farmers are willing to take on the additional responsibility
and associated actions and that they have the knowledge and
resources to implement the changes on their own holdings
(ibid). Research suggests that this is not the case, as stated
concerns for better biosecurity are not being translated into
practice [e.g., (28, 31, 35)]. The reasons cited in Higgins
et al. (78) include: farmers considering their biosecurity to
already be of a satisfactory standard; concerns over the evidence
base underpinning biosecurity interventions and the perceived
controllability of the disease [see also (79)]; the applicability
of universal biosecurity recommendations to individual farms;
and the opinion that biosecurity is essentially a “government
issue” with suggested biosecurity actions representing an external
solution to an externally imposed problem. Taking each of
these issues into account, and adding the unclear cost-benefit of
biosecurity applications for bTB, there is a clear lack of incentives
for taking voluntary action, often leading to uneven application
of measures; the result of which is currently an unknown in terms
of its effect on the UK bTB disease control regime.
Incentivising and Sustaining Change
The Michigan case study responds to a number of these critiques
through creating a clearer rationale for incentivising changes
to biosecurity practices. It also answers concerns about the
utility of a one-size fits all set of recommendations that runs
counter to farmers’ view that these measures are impractical
to implement and that they do not solve the complexity and
uncertainty that are inherently linked to the disease. In a study
of the Biosecurity Intensive Treatment Area (ITA), developed
by the Welsh Assembly Government in 2006, Enticott et al.
(27) highlighted the limitations of universal biosecurity practices
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and the difficulties of inspiring behavioural change with broad-
scale knowledge. Instead, the authors advocated for an approach
that matches solutions to individual farms via a more discursive
process between farmers and advisors. Much like the conclusions
reached in the case study presented here, Enticott et al. [(27), p.
334] state that “whilst some biosecurity interventions may make
veterinary sense, without the support of the farmer and the wider
social environment there is little point suggesting them for they
will be rejected.”
Incorporating processes of discussion, negotiation and
accommodation to individual farm contexts may introduce
concerns about diluting potential management outcomes.
However, as Enticott (26) and Higgins et al. (69) suggest,
finding a balance between standardisation and negotiation may
provide options for progressive and responsive solutions that
incorporates the challenging component of social complexity into
management responses. As multiple authors and policy makers
have stated, people and their actions are critically important
factors in influencing the trajectory of bTB control and progress
towards eradication. Using existing social scientific evidence on
the institutional and farm-level factors that both promote and
undermine efforts to enhance biosecurity responses should be
the first step in devising, implementing, and evaluating different
approaches towards embedding interventions that are capable of
creating and sustaining proactive management options for bTB.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to draw comparative lessons between
the cases of Michigan and the UK to exemplify some of the
challenges of developing an effective strategy for the long-term
control of endemic disease, particularly reflecting on efforts to
“responsibilise” cattle producers and engage them in proactive
activities to mitigate transmission risks on their own farms.
The study was designed to respond to prominent themes in
the social scientific literature that identified a range of socio-
political and economic factors inhibiting the implementation of
risk mitigation measures on farm; an issue that is particularly
critical in areas with endemic bTB. The results indicate that in
contrast to the predominantly voluntary approach pursued in
the UK, Michigan has shifted the emphasis towards obtaining
producer support for wildlife risk mitigation and biosecurity via
a mix of regulatory, fiscal, and social interventions. Whilst there
is a common goal of transferring responsibility to producers
to exert control over their own transmission risks, Michigan’s
WRM exemplifies a socio-technical approach that goes beyond
highlighting what producers can do (through information and
communications campaigns) to incentivising and promoting
change via market (dis)incentives, co-funding, utilising social
networks and tailoring approaches to individual farm contexts.
Neoliberal approaches designed to “responsibilise” cattle
producers have been identified as problematic because the
approach assumes that farmers are willing to take on the
additional responsibility and associated actions and that they
have the knowledge and resources to implement the changes
on their own holdings. Taking these issues into account, and
adding the unclear cost-benefit of biosecurity interventions
for bTB, there is arguably a need to create a clearer
rationale for incentivising changes to biosecurity practices
in the UK. Whilst the scale of the bTB challenge differs
between these two contexts, the development of WRM in
Michigan offers instructive lessons in creating a clearer rationale
for incentivising changes to biosecurity practices and offers
interesting insights on the role of negotiated outcomes in
attempts to adaptively manage a disease that is characterised by
complexity and uncertainty.
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